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Summary: Performance management, a very important process of human resource 
management (HRM), can be significant basis for creating the incentive systems for managers. 
Big enterprises usually reward their Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for success in business. In 
the past period the amounts of managers’ rewards was not correlated with achieved 
performances of enterprises, so it was important to analyze amount of rewards given to the 
managers and methods that can be used to measure achieved managerial performances. 
Subject of this paper was the analysis of compensation systems for managers in ten most 
successful companies of the world and their relation with the business results presented trough 
specific indicators of performances. In addition, paper was subjected to the analysis of several 
methods of measuring performances that can be used in determining realistic amounts and 
structures of CEO rewards and incentives. The aim of this study was the presentation of the 
relation between managers’ rewards and business performances and more objective methods 
for determining these rewards so that compensation packages can meet the requirements of 
effectiveness and efficiency in terms of long-term goals and performances of business system. 
 
Keywords: human resource management, compensations, incentives, performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Performance management implies an assessment of current or previous results or performance 
of the employee, team or the whole organization. On such assessments companies creates its 
policies in many business areas related to HRM: the need for staff training, new recruitment, 
rewarding, etc. In the area of rewards, performance measurement can be significant basis for 
creating the incentive systems for managers. Namely, big enterprises usually reward their 
CEO for success in business. Companies were often very generous in the reward practice for 
managers. But, in the past period, the amounts of managers’ rewards was not correlated with 
achieved performances of enterprises, so it was important to analyze amount of rewards given 
to the managers and methods that can be used to measure achieved managerial performances.  
Subject of this paper was the analysis of compensation systems for managers in ten most 
successful companies in the USA and their relation with the business results presented trough 
specific indicators of performances. The aim of this study was the presentation of the relation 
between managers’ rewards and business performances and different objective methods for 
determining these rewards, so that compensation packages can meet the requirements of 
effectiveness and efficiency. The paper is consisted from tree parts. In the first part, authors 
defined performance measurement and performance measurement system. Second part was 
related to the analysis of the performances in the 10 most successful companies from USA 
(according to the list of the magazine Fortune 500) and to the analysis of the compensations 
of the CEOs in those companies. Third part was dedicated to the presentation of the more 
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comprehensive measurement systems of performances that will be better solution for the 
determining and creation of the CEO compensations: BSC and EVA concept. 
 
2. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Performance measurement is an assessment of current or previous results of performance of 
the employee. According to Neely, Gregory and Plats (1995) performance measurement (PM) 
is defined as ‘‘the process of quantifying effectiveness and efficiency of actions’’. One 
comprehensive definition is that PM is “the process of quantifying the efficiency and 
effectiveness of actions, in order to compare results against expectations, with the intent to 
motivate, guide and improve decision making” (Lardenoije, Van Raaij and Van Weele, 2005). 
Lebas (1995) characterizes performance management system (PMS) as “the philosophy 
supported by performance measurement. It is the organization-wide shared vision, teamwork, 
training, incentives, etc. that surround the performance measurement activity”. PMS is “the 
set of metrics used to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of actions, and the 
corresponding guidelines for linking these metrics to strategy and improvement” (Lardenoije, 
Van Raaij and Van Weele, 2005). The performance measures should be relevant, balanced, 
based on financial and non-financial indicators and related to internal and external 
stakeholders.  
It is important to notice some contemporary researches made in relation to the importance of 
PM in modern business. Nudurupati, Bititci, Kumar and Chan (2011) and Bititci, Garengo, 
Dörfler and Nudurupati (2011) have reviewed and tackled the evolution of the performance 
measurement field in the context of information systems and change management. Also, 
many other researches have been made to explain PM and its implementation in each area of 
business: profit, non-profit, public, private, etc. In this paper PM was analyzed as the base for 
managerial compensations. 
 
3. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AS THE BASE FOR CREATING 
MANAGERIAL INCETIVE COMPENSATIONS 
 
When it comes to the compensation for managers, performance management gets even bigger 
role. The current bureaucratic models of determining these systems had the impact on their 
low motivational force as well as on problems between the owners and managers in terms of 
high agency costs. Jensen and Murphy (2010) considered that there is a major misalignment 
between corporate performance and compensation paid to executives, especially CEOs. 
Adequate systems of compensation for managers should be structured on the basis of actual 
performance. In addition, it would be necessary to determine the controllable and non 
controllable factors (in the sense of those factors that are in the power of manager). If the long 
and short-term incentives for managers are in the question, a very interesting attitude was 
expressed by Malinić (2007) where he stated that short-term compensation should be based on 
standard financial indicators, such as profit (with variations to make it after tax, profit before 
tax and profit before interest and taxes), rate of return, cash flow, earnings per share and the 
like; and long-term compensation should be tied to several criteria that respect the long-term 
profitability; long-term position of the company and movement of the total shareholder 
returns (dividends and capital gains). The criteria for achieving long-term compensation 
imposed are the market value of companies, economic value added EVA, market 
value added MVA, the total shareholder return TSR, etc. For the more comprehensive view of 
the performance measures and indicators in Table 1 there are summarized the indicators for 
the evaluation of the performance of the organization. 
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Table 1: Performance management tools and indicators 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS INDICATORS OF TOTAL PERFORMANCES 
Return on Investment (ROI) 
Balanced scorecard (BSC)
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Tableau du Board (TdB)
Earnings per Share (EPS) 
Cash flow (CF) 
Performance Prism (PPR)
Revenue (I) 
Profit (P) 
Performance Pyramid System (PPS)
Total Shareholder return (TSR) 
Market Value Added (MVA) Productivity Measurement and Enhancement 
System (ProMES)Economic Value Added (EVA) 
Source: Malinić, 2007; Lardenoije, Van Raaij, Van Weele, 2005. 
 
In order to show the level of compensation, their structure and relation to the performance, it 
has been made the analysis of performances of the top ten USA companies (according to 
Fortune 500 http://money.cnn.com, table 2) and it’s managerial reward packages (Hay Group 
for 2010, http://www.haygroup.com, table 3). According tables, it can be concluded next: 
▪ Each company from table 2, except Bank of America and Fannie Mae, had a profitable 
business 2010 year. There has been noticed the growth of revenues and profits, 
accompanied with the growth of earning per share (EPS) from 2009 to 2010. For example, 
the growth of the revenue is between 3.3 and 32.6 % (Fannie Mae reached even 429.2% 
higher revenue than in 2009), the growth of profit is between 5.6 and 141.5%. EPS growth 
was from 20.8 to 135.2%. Also, each company, except Bank of America and Fannie Mae, 
had positive indicators of ROA, ROE and ROI, which means that those companies have 
created return on assets, investments and equity. This can be explained as short-term gain 
for the company since all those indicators are related to the annual business and financial 
operations.  
▪ Main elements of CEO compensations are: base salary; annual incentives; long term 
incentives – stock options grants, restricted stock grants, performance-based grants in 
equity and cash; all other compensations (perquisites, personal benefits) and change in 
nonqualified deferred compensation earnings plus change in pension value. 
▪ Basic salary is the smallest part of the total compensations, and it estimates from 6.97% 
(in Wall Mart) to 16.8% (in General Electric) of total compensations. In companies that 
did not create long and short-term incentives, salary is the biggest or even the only 
element of the compensations (Berkshire Hathaway and General Motors). Basic salary is 
determined by the working contract between managers and companies, and it is fixed 
amount that is paid with no relation to the performances.  
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Table 2: The performances of the 10 most successful companies from the list of Fortune in 2010 
R Company 
Key financial elements in millions of $ 
Pr 
(%) 
ROA 
(%) 
ROE 
(%) 
EPS ROI 
Revenues  
% 
change 
from 
2009 
Profits 
% 
change 
from 
2009 
Assets Stockholders' equity 
Market 
 value  
(3/25/2011) 
2000-
2010 
Annual 
growth 
(%) 
2010 
$ 
% 
change 
from 
2009 
2000-
2010 
Annual 
rate 
(%) 
2010 
(%) 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 421,849 3.3 16,389 14.3 180,663 68,542 182,764 3.9 9.1 23.9 12.3 4.47 20.8 1.4 3.2 
2 Exxon Mobil 354,674 24.6 30,460 58 302,510 146,839 414,638 8.6 10.1 20.7 9.5 6.22 56.3 7.7 10.1 
3 Chevron 196,337 20.1 19,024 81.5 184,769  105,081  214,355.5  9.7 10.3 18.1 9.1 9.48  80.9  11.6 22.9 
4 ConocoPhillips 184,966 32.6 11,358 133.8 156,314  68,562  116,812.3  6.1 7.3 16.6 7.7 7.62  135.2  12.2 38.8 
5 Fannie Mae 153,825 429.2 -14,014 N.A. 3,221,972  -2,599  447.9  -9.1 -0.4 N.A. N.A. -3.81  N.A.  -42.1 -74.6 
6 General Electric 151,628 -3.3 11,644 5.6 751.216  118.936  209,715.2  7.7 1.6 9.8 -1.8 1.06  5.0  -6.3 23.9 
7 Berkshire Hathaway 136,185 21.1 12,967 61 372,229  157,318  210,787.5  9.5 3.5 8.2 13.8  7.0 52.7  5.4 21.4 
8 General Motors 135,592 29.6 6,172 N.A. 138,898  36,180  49,116.6  4.6 4.4 17.1 N.A. 2.89  N.A.  N.A. N.A. 
9 Bank of America  134,194 -10.8 -2,238 -135.7 2,264,909  228,248  135,016.2  -1.7 -0.1 -1.0 N.A. -0.37  N.A.  -1.7 -11.2 
10 Ford Motor 128,954 9 6,561 141.5 164,687  -673  55,715  5.1 4.0 N.A -3.2 1.66 93.0  -1.2 67.9 
 
Table 3: CEO compensations of the 10 most successful companies from the list of Fortune in 2010 
R Company 
Elements of total compensations for CEO in (000 $) 
Salary 
An. 
incenti
ves 
Long term incentives (000$) - LTI Total 
direct 
compensati
ons 
Change in 
Nonqualified Deferred 
Compensation + 
Change in Pension 
Value 
All Other 
Compensat
ion 
Total 
Compensation 
Total 
Realized 
LTI 
3-Year Realized 
Total Direct 
Compensation 
Stock 
option 
grants 
Restricted 
stock 
grants 
Performance 
Based Grant 
Equity 
Performance 
Based Grant 
Cash 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 1,232.7 3,852.1 0 3,347.5 9,304.9 0 17,737.1 499.1 476.6 18,712.7 17,592.8 N.A.16 
2 Exxon Mobil 2,207.0 3,360.0 0 15,465.4 0 0 21,032.4 7,476.3 443.9 28,952.6 7,989.7 33,000.2 
3 Chevron 1,479.2 3,000.0 5,535.2 0 3,752.4 0 13,776.8 2,273.3 220.5 16,260.5 3,101.7 N.A. 
4 ConocoPhillips 1,500.0 4,252.5 5,737.7 0 6,148.6 0 17,638.8 0 294.1 17,932.9 9,566.3 36,299.1 
5 Fannie Mae N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
6 General Electric 3,300.0 4,000.0 7,400.0 0 0 4,950.0 19,650.0 6,339.0 389.8 26,378.8 1,933.1 25,093.6 
7 Berkshire Hathaway 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 0 429.9 524.9 0 300.0 
8 General Motors 2.333.3 0 0 666.7 0 0 3,000.0 0 194.1 3,194.1 0 N.A. 
9 Bank of America  950.0 0 0 9,050.0 0 0 10,000.0 719.8 270.2 10,990.1 1,039.3 N.A. 
10 Ford Motor 1,400.0 9,450.0 7,500.0 0 7,492.5 0 25,842.5 0 678.0 26,520.5 9,298.0 25,888.0 
                                                 
16 Data not available 
173 
 
▪ Annual incentives are usually double or even several times bigger than salary. These 
incentives are paid in almost each company where have been created positive business 
result, profit and performance indicators of ROA, ROE, ROI and EPS. In Bank of 
America annual incentives were not paid since that corporation realized loss in 2010 of $-
2,238 millions. Annual incentives are usually paid for the short time period. 
▪ Long-term incentives have reached level from 58% to 74% of total compensations, with 
the exception of General Electric Company (LTI are only 22% of total compensations). 
Long-term incentives are differently used in each company. The most used are stock 
options, restricted stocks and performance based equity grants. The performance based 
cash grants were used only by one company. In addition, five companies form the table 3 
used two LTI elements in rewarding its CEO - stock options and performance based 
equity grants. Last five companies decided to give to the CEOs only one LTI incentive - 
restricted stock grant.  
▪ Related to the long term incentives is also the tendency of rewarding CEO with more 
deferred compensations. Namely, performance based cash grants were used only in 
General Electric Company. All other companies gave to the CEOs compensations in form 
of capital – equity and stocks. For example, restricted stocks were given as compensation 
in four out of ten companies. Stock options were used in four cases.  
▪ Since the economic crisis had affected the business and economy in many world 
countries, wastefully CEO compensation models became untenable. HR managers are 
trying to create models that will be enough motivating but also sustainable in means of 
real business performances. The goal of any compensation system should be to attract, 
motivate and retain the best managers, while at the same time being fair to the 
shareholders.  
 
After the discussion of Tables 2 and 3, it can be concluded that there are many issues related 
to the amount and structure of CEO compensation. These remunerations should be based on 
outcomes and total business performances of the company. Since only financial indicators are 
not suitable for the total compensation system, it should me mentioned some other 
performance measurement model in practice that could be linked to this problem. From all 
models presented in Table 1, BSC and EVA were found as the performance measurement 
models that can be used in function of efficient and effective CEO compensation systems.  
 
4. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS FOR CEO INCENTIVE 
COMPENSATIONS IN PRACTICE 
 
4.1. THE BALANCED SCORECARD (BSC)   
 
One of the best known performance measurement system is the balanced scorecard (BSC), 
developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992; 1996; 1996a). Kaplan and Norton (1996a) define the 
BSC as “a multidimensional framework for describing, implementing and managing strategy 
at all levels of an enterprise by linking, through a logical structure, objectives, initiatives, and 
measures to an organization’s strategy”. BSC complements the traditional financial 
performance measures with three non-financial key performance indicators (KPIs): financial 
perspective; customer perspective; internal processes; learning and growth. 
Pollanen and Xi (2011) had investigated the use of BSC measures in executive compensation 
plans, particularly its performance consequences, and the fit between the use of BSC and firm 
characteristics. The findings underscored the importance of firm characteristics in the design 
and use of performance measurement and reward systems. Creamer and Freund (2010) 
analyzed the BSC and one of the most important parts of its dataset was CEO compensations. 
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They demonstrated how the boosting approach can be used to define a data driven board BSC 
with applications to 500 biggest USA companies. Without further literature analysis, in table 
4 it has been presented the example of CEO incentive compensation designed according to 
BSC. Jones (2009) claimed that CEO paid bonus percentage should be tied to the percentage 
of exceeding performance targets. 
 
Table 4: Executive compensation systems according BSC dimensions 
Category Measure Weighting 
Financial (60%) 
EVA  
Unit Profit  
Market Growth  
25% 
20% 
15% 
Customer (20%) Customer satisfaction survey  Dealer satisfaction survey  
10% 
10% 
Internal Process (10%)  Above average rank on industry quality survey  Decrease in dealer delivery cycle time 
5% 
5% 
Innovation and Learning (10%) Suggestions/employee  Emp. satisfaction survey  
5% 
5% 
Source: Jones (2009). 
 
4.2. ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED (EVA)  
 
EVA is defined as the change in the NOPAT (Net Operating Profit after Taxes) minus the 
change in the Cost of the Capital used to generate this NOPAT (Kumar and Kaura, 2002; 
Sharma and Kumar, 2010). EVA can provide investors with a normal return on the company’s 
shares—that is important not only for securities analysts in evaluating stocks, but also for 
corporate compensation committees in setting performance standards for management 
incentive compensation plans (O’Byrne, 1996). Namely, EVA bonus plan measures excess 
EVA improvement as opposed to simply EVA growth over prior periods. It provides a more 
direct link to the true measure of shareholder wealth creation – returns above market 
expectations (Young and O’Byrne, 2001).  Following formula can be used to calculate CEO 
bonus in each year: 
 
 Current Year Bonus = Target Bonus + y% (EVA – Ei) (1) 
 
Target bonus is “the bonus earned by a manager for delivering the EVA improvement that is 
expected by investors. This expected EVA improvement should be equivalent to the EVA that 
will provide shareholders with a cost of capital return on the market value of their investment 
in the business” (Balsley, 2005). If EVA is below this level, bonuses will be reduced while 
returns of shareholders do not fall to zero. At this level, there will be no bonuses for 
managers. EVA – EI represents “the change in EVA less expected EVA improvement. This 
is meant to capture the incremental EVA that a manager has delivered above and beyond the 
EVA growth that investors expect and have already paid for. The percentage of the 
incremental performance that is returned to management (y) is established by the 
compensation committee” (Balsley, 2005). 
Additional incentives beyond the level of the target bonus are provided for increasing the 
EVA above the level provided by covering the total cost of capital and only the part of EVA 
that is increased above the expected level. In this way it will be prevented the excessive 
increase of compensation costs. If the criteria for bonuses was any increase in EVA, then 
there will be situations in which one reached EVA (above the level that provides target 
bonus) is decreasing, which is usually accompanied by a decline in value of shares and 
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managers will still exercise bonuses over  target level (Malinić, 2007). Because of this, Stern 
Stewart & Co proposed the use of a “bonus bank” designed to base a manager’s annual bonus 
payout on multi-period EVA delivery. In every year, the “current year bonus” is calculated 
using the formula described above and based on the manager’s performance during that year. 
That “current year bonus” is then placed in a “bonus bank” that also holds the deferred (or 
unpaid portion of) bonuses from prior years. The bonus bank balance (after the current year 
bonus has been included), rather than the current year bonus, then determines the amount of 
bonus actually earned by a manager each year. The amount earned is determined in two steps: 
first, 100% of the bonus bank (if possible) is paid up to the amount of the target bonus; 
second, plus 1/3 of the remaining bonus bank (after the target bonus) (Balsley, 2005). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Incentive systems for managers are very complex area of HRM. A mixture of compensations 
elements, importance of short and long – term incentives for managers and problem of 
rewarding in the past make this issue more sophisticated. Usually, executive compensations 
was weakly correlated or even no correlated with the achieved performances. Because of 
these issues and problems, there is a need for improvement in the design of managerial 
compensations. Main conclusions of this paper are: 
▪ Main elements of CEO compensations are: base salary, annual incentives, long term 
incentives, all other compensations, change in nonqualified deferred compensation 
earnings plus change in pension value.  
▪ Basic salary is the smallest part of the total compensations in companies that rewarded its 
managers with diversified compensation package, and it estimates from 6.97% to 16.8%.  
▪ Annual incentives are usually double or even several times bigger than salary. These 
incentives are paid in almost each company where have been created positive business 
result and performance indicators of ROA, ROE, ROI and EPS.  
▪ Long-term incentives have reached level from 58% to 74% of total compensations. The 
most used are stock options, restricted stocks and performance based equity grants. 
Related to the long term incentives is also the tendency of rewarding CEO with more 
deferred compensations.  
▪ One of the best known performance measurement systems is the balanced scorecard that 
provides an enterprise view of an organization’s overall performance. According to BSC, 
CEO paid bonus percentage should be tied to the percentage of exceeding performance 
targets – financial, commercial, internal processes and learning and innovation. 
▪ EVA incentive compensations are based not only on the year increase in EVA, but on the 
increase that is above expected EVA improvement. Bonus bank is usually used to 
motivate managers to make decisions that will create superior performances and value for 
the shareholders continuously. This method will connect results of managers to the 
deferred bonus payout.  
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